



Seth Anandram Jaipuria  
Model United Nations  
2025



**UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY COUNCIL**

# INDEX

1. Letter from the Executive Board
2. About the Committee
3. A brief political history of the governments in Sahel
4. Case study 1: Sahel as a zone prone to coup d'etat
5. Root causes for the conflict in the Sahel region
6. Major Stakeholders on Military Coups
  - Mali
  - Burkina Faso
  - Niger
  - Chad
  - Mauritania
7. United Nations Initiatives and Resolutions
8. Major events that took place in Sahel
9. United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS)
10. Involvement of Non-State Actors in this conflict
11. Foreign Intervention in the Sahel
  - Foreign Intervention in Mali
  - Foreign Intervention in Burkina Faso
  - Foreign Intervention in Niger
12. Case Study 2: Sahel as a pawn of Western Paternalism
13. Suggested topics for Moderated Caucuses
14. External Links

# Letter from the Executive Board

"Across the Sahel sands where coups unfold their might,  
UN strategies struggle between darkness and light;  
Between terror's rise and democracy's uncertain fate,  
Framework must transform, before it grows too late"

-The Executive Board  
(unscsajmun2025@gmail.com)

Dear Delegates,  
Greetings!

It fills us with immense pleasure and enthusiasm to welcome you to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to be simulated at the Eleventh Edition of the Seth Anandram Jaipuria Model United Nations 2025.

Today, when the world is witnessing horrors that bring shame to our status as a developed, educated and civil society, we must not let our voices falter for the sake of protecting the integrity and sovereignty of all nations worldwide. It is our utmost duty as learned citizens of this world to deliberate upon the pressing issue at hand to devise viable, pragmatic and inclusive solutions to a longstanding persistent issue. In hopes of protecting the liberty and rights of civilians and fostering peace and stability in an injured land, the agenda for the committee is- "Contemplating the efficacy of UN Operations in the Sahel region in addressing Coups d'État with special emphasis on reforming the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel."

The Background Guide prepared for this committee has been meticulously researched and structured to provide delegates with a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted dimensions of this issue. It includes pertinent case studies, timeline of the conflict, historical context, and contemporary developments relevant to the agenda. We strongly encourage all delegates to thoroughly examine this document as the foundation for their preparation. However, please note that the Background Guide should serve merely as a starting point. Rigorous independent research, incorporating reputable academic sources, policy papers, and current affairs, is essential for meaningful participation. As representatives of sovereign nations, delegates are expected to uphold their assigned country's foreign policy positions with utmost fidelity, regardless of personal opinions or the controversial nature of such positions. The essence of diplomatic discourse lies in advancing national interests while navigating the complex terrain of international cooperation. This committee will operate under formal procedure with

English as the exclusive language of communication. We anticipate intellectually stimulating debates characterized by diplomatic courtesy, and pragmatic solutions to be tabled in the committee. This simulation of The United Nations Security Council is not a mere platform for you to voice your thoughts, but to step into the shoes of another nation as a diplomat, with immense power and prowess, for something more significant than all of us. We sincerely hope that this committee succeeds in the endeavour it has set out to achieve, and secures a lasting impression on your mind for the years to come, both as memories and learnings. We hence leave you with this key to unlock the plethora of knowledge that awaits you at this year's conference.

The Executive Board remains at your disposal for any clarifications or assistance you may require in your preparation. We look forward to witnessing your diplomatic acumen and collaborative spirit during the committee sessions.

Looking forward to a productive conference.

Good Luck!

Best Regards,

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\*Delegates, kindly note that there is no provision for pre-committee paperwork for UNSC to be stimulated at the conference. Any Paperwork, such as Drafts, Substantive Chits, Reports, Resolutions, or Sources of Information asked by the Executive Board will be emailed to [unscsajmun2025@gmail.com](mailto:unscsajmun2025@gmail.com) \*



# About The Committee

Assuming the principal responsibility for upholding and preserving international peace and security, the

United Nations Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council takes on a prominent role in determining the existence of a peace threat or an aggressive act, as stated in the United Nations Charter. In addition, it encourages the disputing parties to pursue peaceful solutions and provides suggestions for ways to reconcile or conditions for achieving a settlement. To maintain global stability, its main objective is to prevent conflicts and settle disputes between nations.

The Security Council consists of ten elected members, and five permanent members (The People's Republic of China, The United States of America, The French Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The Russian Federation). Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The current and past membership of the Security Council since 1946 can be found in the Members section of the Charter of the United Nations.

The UN Charter, which serves as the foundational document of the organisation, outlines the following key purposes:

- 1.To maintain international peace and security;
- 2.To develop friendly relations among nations;
- 3.To cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- 4.And to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations.

As a prominent international institution, the United Nations Security Council serves as a platform for diplomacy, negotiation, and cooperation among member states to address global challenges and maintain international peace and security. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

**For more information about the mandate of the Security Council, please refer to Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.**

# A brief political history of the governments in Sahel

## INDEPENDENCE AND EARLY YEARS OF THE SAHEL REGION

On 1 September 1939, the German invasion of Poland started, essentially declaring the initiation of World War II. Throughout this devastating large-scale conflict, multiple parts of Africa were to be constituted of strategic importance, including the Sahel region which was one of them. Through their contribution to the war, mainly as French colonies fighting for Free France, they became largely self-aware and conscious of their rights to sovereignty and independence. Thus began a more than decade-long campaign for the independence of what was known as “L’ Afrique Noire”. Multiple alliances were formed to support the self-governance of the French colonies in Africa and many legal frameworks were passed, gradually making that a realistic possibility. With the contribution of many domestic and foreign political figures, in April 1961 with the cooperation agreements between Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger and France, the decolonization of the Sahel region had been achieved. However, almost none of the newly born states were adequately prepared for independence. Economic viability was nonexistent in all nations due to high dependence on French funds while many were landlocked and covered almost entirely by thinly populated desert. To tend to the needs of their former colonies, the French, who kept close ties with the nations of the Sahel, sent support, which reinforced their influence in the region. This in turn supported widespread corruption and embezzlement as countries were run by elite groups that were accustomed to collaborating with the French. The regimes that arose were characterized by corruption that gradually left the region with control of almost none of the limited resources available to it. Multiple coup d’ états have taken place in all countries in the region and even when democracy is restored it is short-lived and mostly illegitimate. Weapon, human and drug trafficking is uncontrollable, with criminals often cooperating with corrupt authorities. The conditions were perfect for violence to occur

## THE TUAREG PEOPLE AND THE ERUPTION OF VIOLENCE IN THE SAHEL

One of the main outbreaks was the Tuareg rebellion of 2012 in Mali, which marked the initiation of religious conflict in the Sahel. The Tuareg people have had a history of rebellion, mainly in Mali and Niger.

With the downfall of the Gadaffi regime in Libya in 2011 an influx of trained and armed military personnel of Tuareg people fled to Mali. Their existence in the region reignited the conflict, giving a religious spirit to the revolution by aligning themselves with multiple

jihadist organizations including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine.<sup>11</sup> The inability of the governmental forces to suppress the rebellion resulted in a military coup which was relatively unsuccessful in tackling the crisis. The institutions in the northern parts of Mali experienced a collapse, following the overthrow of the former government, opening a window for the Tuareg, who had planned for the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), to take over the region. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad is a self-declared Islamic caliphate, maintaining control of the northern parts of Mali. A short period of peace took place until violence erupted once again in January 2013. In August 2013, democracy was restored in Mali which, in 2015, signed a peace agreement with the Tuareg people. This ceasefire, however, did not include organizations apart from the MNLA and other Tuareg groups, which rushed to increase their influence locally and in neighboring states. Following that, violence has been at an all-time high in the region. The next major escalating step was taken with the formation of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in Burkina Faso in 2016 and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) in Mali in 2017. The two groups have organized into local al-Qaeda affiliated organizations. Parallel to the conflict in Liptako an epicenter for violence has emerged around lake Chad where Boko Haram focused its activity. Since its foundation in 2002, it has strived to attain power in the intersection between Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. In 2015, Boko Haram was renamed to Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP). ISWAP is currently in control of northern Nigeria and parts of Niger. Another factor is international involvement, which began with the French forces in 2013. Operation Barkhane based in Chad with the support of local forces, had the aim of tackling terrorist action in the extended region and cracking down on Boko Haram. Other states and organizations shortly followed with the UN-led Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the Task Force Takuba by the European Union.



Fig 1: Map of the Sahel Region

#### **TIMELINE:**

1960's- French colonial rule gradually withdraws and independent states form in the Sahel region. 2002- Mohammed Yusuf establishes the Islamist militant group Boko Haram.

2011- NATO forces along with national rebel militias topple Muammar Gaddafi's regime.

2012- Tuareg separatists and armed Islamist groups occupy territory by force in northern Mali.

20 December 2012- The UNSC adopts Resolution 2085 and authorizes troops to be deployed in Mali as part of the AFISMA mission.

January 2013- The ECOWAS leads an international support mission to Mali named AFISMA.

2014 -The governance of Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso ends.

May 2015- Mali negotiates with Tuareg rebel groups and ultimately signs the Mali-MNLA Peace Accord, also known as the "Algiers Accord".

2016- Many small Jihadist movements gradually coordinate into and form the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).

2017- Four major Mali based extremist groups merge to form the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM).

2021-The French government terminates Operation Barkhane.

2022- Mali withdraws from the G5 Sahel alliance.

2022- The European Union following the French government withdraws Task Force Takuba. March 2023- IS Sahel's focus shifts to Niger after they defeat JNIM.

16 June 2023- Mali requests the immediate withdrawal of the MINUSMA.

30 June 2023- The UNSC adopts Resolution 2690, ordering the cessation of the MINUSMA. July 2023- A military coup forces Niger's recently elected President Mohamed Bazoum to step down.

30 July 2023- Unknown non-state actors, attempt a bombing attack against the French embassy in Niger. December 2023- Burkina Faso and Niger both withdraw from the G5 Sahel Alliance

31 December 2023-MINUSMA completely withdraws from Mali in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2690.




# Case study 1: Sahel as a zone prone to coup d'etat

The Sahel is a region of western and north-central Africa extending from Senegal to Sudan. It forms a transitional zone between the desert of Sahara to the north and the belt of humid savannas to the south. The Sahel stretches from the Atlantic Ocean eastward through northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, the great bend of the Niger River in Mali, Burkina Faso, southern Niger, northeastern Nigeria, south-central Chad, and into Sudan.

The Sahel region is currently suffering a geo-political crisis and severe economic, political and security instability which have all led to the displacement of millions of people from their homes. Humanitarian rights violations and the security risks in the region will only increase while armed conflicts are still ongoing. As a result of the impoverishment of these nations, violence has begun to rise and multiple terrorist organizations have found an opportunity to seize power in parts of the area. The last ten years have especially been characterized by political instability caused by the numerous jihadist threats, military coups and the rise of ethnic violence. The current crises are caused by some distinct and persistent problems plaguing the region alongside its geography and history. In addition, following the independence of the area in the 1960's, a series of weak governments have risen to power and corruption has reached an all-time high. Food insecurity linked with the fact that most Sahel nations are made up of different and even historically competing ethnic groups makes intra and extranational conflicts more likely. Another factor that contributes to the crisis is the population which is growing rapidly compared to other regions globally. These matters in addition to the increased extremism that was always present in the region and the existence of military equipment in the area and in neighboring states due to ethnic conflicts, formed the perfect conditions for terrorist insurgencies to occur leading to instability in Sahel. Each nation has faced similar problems but to different extents due to the differences in terrain and ethnic groups that they consist of. It is important to examine how each country has tried to face these issues as well as to analyze the causes that led to these problems for each nation of the Sahel. The effect of this multifaceted crisis on the welfare of the citizens is detrimental. People are fleeing their homes, often reaching countries that are not much safer than their own. All the numbers are pointing to the direction of a growing crisis that is slipping out of control and is causing devastation to millions of people. The situation in Sahel has alerted foreign forces and international bodies as the instability of the region and the constant increase of violence has been considered a threat to international security as it can easily spread to neighboring nations and disturb the peace of other

countries.

Despite the initiation of international efforts to put an end to the conflict in the Sahel region, violence and tension only seemed to increase, while specifically targeting foreign military campaigns and UN peacekeeping operations' officers. This resulted in the withdrawal of both Operation Barkhane and Task Force Takuba in 2021 and 2022 respectively. Their absence from the area has resulted in a drastic increase in violence. It additionally attracted the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor which is widely critiqued for human rights violations and attacks against civilians. At the same time, the third coup recorded in the past decade took place in Mali with vice president Assimi Goïta forcibly seizing power. The rise of his military regime was matched with increased violence against the local population. In May 2022 all connections to French Defense programs were cut, when Mali withdrew from the Sahel G5, a regional cooperative framework focused on defense from terrorist action, bringing a noticeable decrease in the capabilities of the organization. Major terrorist events have taken place since the success of the coup with a notable one being the killing of 132 villagers in central Mali in June 2022 and the Moura massacre in March 2022. The massacre is attributed to the Malian forces in conjunction with the Wagner Group.



# Root causes for the conflict in the Sahel region

The Sahel region covers a large area of dangerous and unpredictable terrain characterized by extreme weather conditions. The geographical Sahel is a very flat, semi-arid region where there are usually high temperatures and a small period, for about two months yearly, that it is rainy. Thus, droughts are an eminent danger as they can last even for years. The part of Sahel closer to the Sahara desert is more affected. During those times, famine was an occurring issue as even dry resistant plants found commonly in Sahel cannot survive those conditions, so there is a lack of crops. This weather adds to the already existing food crisis in the region. The issue is that with climate change, these extreme weather events will only worsen. In 2018, more than 1.3 million children across the Sahel countries and Senegal required treatment for severe acute malnutrition, according to United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Malnutrition makes the population more vulnerable to other diseases in the area, such as water borne diseases. All the matters above lead to an ongoing health and humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region.

More specifically, Sahel connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Red Sea as well as North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, making the region a very good and practical route for groups involved in illicit drug trafficking and trafficking of other illegal substances and goods, for smuggling them all across the world. The region consists largely of rural areas that are difficult to be controlled by the governments, causing Sahel to be perceived as a potent security threat internationally, taking into consideration the fact that these unprotected areas are home to many dangerous organizations. Furthermore, international borders in the region span immense distances and so can be easily trespassed by traffickers.

The instability in the Northern Sahel region is also a driving factor. The northern parts of Sahel are considered difficult to inhabit and travel through considering the fact that they are characterized by instability and lack of security, a situation even recognized by international organs. These parts also border other nations which have been unstable over the years, making northern Sahel a suitable area for terrorist organizations to settle and use as means of attacking other countries nearby or by obtaining more land from the Sahel nations in order to gain power. The great difference between the northern and southern part of Sahel; namely that the north is unstable and difficult to manage while the south is more easily habitable and economically advanced, causes great inequalities across the region and creates divides between central governments and the northern areas, potentially making them an easier target of attack.



The Sahel was recently decolonized by the French. As a result, the region hosts a variety of cultures and religions. The majority of the people are Muslim, Tuareg in the north, the Soninke in the west, the Malinke in Mali and Senegal, the Songhai in the south and the Fulani and Hausa in Niger and Nigeria. 13 The number of different ethnic groups often causes tension between them and regional conflicts begin. Moreover, due to the rapid and unorganized way that the Sahel was decolonized, the borders of the nations do not necessarily reflect the way that the different cultural and ethnic groups are allocated in the region and the way they have been living in them for the past centuries. This has created nations that consist of large minorities which often have historical conflict.

The situation in Sahel is a very fragile one with constant violence and attacks by terrorist groups which cause security instability and threaten the safety of civilians. The national governments have tried to intervene but without any success as the methods they follow are extreme violence and attacks to those involved in the conflict. Also, due to the different ethnic groups that the region consists of, there have been cases of favoritism by the governments that leads to corruption and puts some minorities in a disadvantaged position. So, the situation calls for international involvement. Historically different governments and people have accepted international aid, but many communities and now governments are untrusting towards foreign and especially western affiliated organizations. This inability to receive non-regional aid is what continues to fuel the conflict and there has not been an end put to this crisis that has been ongoing for more than a decade. Furthermore, the fact that this region was colonized by Europeans for a long time, has caused the hate-centered sentiment of those populations towards international organizations and other nations. Both France and the US as well as the United Nations have sent forces to Sahel but without any success. The Sahel region was colonized by the French and, as previously mentioned, the decolonization of the region was rapid and messy, the civilians in Sahel have developed an anti-French and generally feelings of hatred towards foreign forces.

# Major Stakeholders on Military Coups

- **MALI**

The Tuareg rebellion in Mali which embroiled over half of the state in 2012, is considered to be the starting

point of the renewed cycle of violence in the Sahel region. Between then and now there have been 3 successful coup attempts one in 2012 and two between 2020 and 2021 happening only 9 months apart. Despite chronic political instability, up until 2021 Mali successfully cooperated with the international community to accomplish significant military victories against IS and Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups which occupied much of its west and northern land. However, these efforts were not enough to prevent terrorist campaigns from extending across its borders. Mali also reached a political settlement in 2015 with the secessionist Tuareg movements which however has now been officially abandoned by all parties. Since the fall of political rule in 2021 there has been a resurgence of violence and state forces have been accused of committing international crimes in cooperation with the Wagner Group by several human rights organizations. The current military government has indefinitely postponed legislative elections which were expected to be held in February 2024 and the new constitution that it has enforced would allow it to hold power indefinitely. The military government is broadly set on opposing UN and western intervention in its campaign to push back secessionist and terrorist forces.

In 2012, a deep crisis took hold in Mali following the takeover of the North by independence and then Islamist groups and a coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré. At the request of the Malian president, France intervened militarily in January 2013 with Operation Serval to halt the advance of jihadist forces and allow the country to regain its territorial integrity. Presidential and legislative elections were held in 2013. France is part of the international mediation that supports the agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali, which is the result of the Algiers process. This agreement marks an important step and its implementation is essential for the sustainable stabilization of Mali.

Mali has faced two coups d'état in nine months: August 2020 and May 2021 and is going through a transition phase. On July 3, 2022, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took note of the transition timetable submitted by the Transitional Authorities, which provides for a duration of 24 months starting March 29, 2022.

## • BURKINA FASO

Burkina Faso has suffered from many insurgencies in the last decade, especially after Blaise Compaore, the country's long reigning head of state, fled his post and the country in the face of mounting popular pressure in November 2014. Since then, successive governments have faced coups d'état, leaving the country without effective political leadership for years. The initial power vacuum allowed the JNIM and other ISIS and Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist organisations to establish a foothold in the country. The inability of governments to eradicate the terrorist threats has often been used by military leaders as an excuse to stage coups d'état even against already established military governments, which however have only managed to worsen the security situation. According to a recent UN report, almost one in every four people in Burkina Faso, a country of 20 million people, need urgent humanitarian assistance. An estimated 1.7 million people have also been displaced due to the insecurity.<sup>15</sup> All of the above coupled with the fact that terrorist activity in Burkina Faso seems to be steadily increasing make it the current epicenter of the Sahel's broader crisis. Burkina Faso suffered its second coup of the year 2022 when Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the 34-year-old head of an artillery unit of the Armed Forces of Burkina Faso, declared himself head of state on September 30. The coup ousted the previous junta leader, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba. Traoré justified his seizure of power on Burkina Faso's deteriorating security situation. Damiba had led an earlier coup in January 2022, similarly claiming he would address the country's security crisis. Traoré was a participant in the January coup and was aided in the latest putsch by several members of Damiba's junta. In contrast, other junta members continued to side with Damiba. Most Burkinabe military officers, meanwhile, have not participated in either coup, underscoring the fragmented state of Burkina Faso's armed forces and the highly arbitrary means by which power has changed hands. Traoré's junta hastily organized a 2-day national forum on October 14 and 15. With junta representatives dominating the proceedings, it was little surprise that Traoré was designated as the transitional president and that the junta retained significant authority in the transitional governing charter. The coup also resulted in the suspension of ongoing major military operations in some of the worst affected zones, including the north central, tri-border, eastern, and western zones. Burkina Faso's military government said on April 21 that it had foiled a "major plot" to overthrow the country's junta leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré. The military government first gained knowledge of the plot when it intercepted communications between a high-ranking Burkinabé military officer and terrorist leaders. Security Minister Mahamadou Sana said on state television that plotters included current and former soldiers, as well as terrorists. He cited Captain René David Ouédraogo as one of the soldiers who rallied to the plan. Ouédraogo is currently on the run. The coup attempt aimed to "sow total chaos, and place the country under the supervision of an

international organisation", Sana said. Plotters had planned to swarm the presidential palace on 16 April 2025. This is just the latest attempt to overthrow Ibrahim Traoré after he seized power in a 2022 coup. The junta had already claimed to have foiled a destabilisation plot in September 2024. Traoré's military government had pledged to fight jihadist groups and had even sought support from Russia, but security threats persist as 40% of the country remains under jihadist control. The Sahel region remains an epicentre of terrorist violence and Burkina Faso was the country most affected by terrorism in 2024 with 1,532 deaths, according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. Mahamadou Sana also claimed that the plot instigators are based in Ivory Coast. Ivorian authorities have not yet commented on this accusation. Back in September 2024, Burkina Faso had already accused Ivory Coast of hosting conspirators.

## • NIGER

Niger is one of the poorest African countries despite its significant uranium reserves. Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad are its three neighboring countries in the Sahel region and the first three have been under most pressure by terrorist activity in the region and thus terrorist activity and fighting has spilled over into the country's borders frequently. Niger has had fairly stable political rule from 2010 up until July 2023 when a military coup removed a newly popularly elected President Mohamed Bazoum from power. The coup came at a time of worsening environmental and economic conditions for the country which in combination with a resurgence of IS related terrorist activity in the north is severely shocking civil order across the country. The current military government along with the juntas of Mali and Burkina Faso, is not in contact with neither the regional ECOWAS organization nor the UN. Many western states including France have evacuated their embassies and urged their nationals to follow. On July 26, Niger's government was overthrown, and President Mohamed Bazoum was taken hostage. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued an ultimatum to the coup leaders, threatening military intervention if deposed Bazoum was not returned to power. ECOWAS member states suspended relations with Niger and closed their land and air borders with the country. The governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, both led by military coup leaders, issued a joint statement warning that an ECOWAS intervention in Niger could lead to a military response from their states. On August 20, the main coup leader and self-proclaimed head of state, General Abdourahmane Tiani, presented his roadmap in a televised address: a transition period of no more than three years and an inclusive national dialogue. He also reiterated that his country would defend itself in the event of military intervention. This coup in West Africa is a major blow to Niger, the Sahel region, and West Africa as a whole. The junta has publicly accused France, which has

some 1,500 troops in Niger, of trying to destabilize the country. The crisis has also been closely monitored in Washington given the presence of U.S. military bases and political engagement in the landlocked country at the heart of the Sahel. While Niger's economic and social indicators place it at the bottom of global development indices, these metrics also understate the country's strategic importance of this vast country. Its geographical position at the crossroads of North, West, and Central Africa; its mineral and oil resources; its potential for the development of renewable energies; and its strong demographic growth help explain the seemingly outsized interest of medium and large powers in the current crisis. Below is an exploration of the major ways the crisis has rippled through the country, the region, and the world.

## • CHAD

The political situation in Chad is off-balance and unsure right now. A military government has ruled the country since April 2021, when a group of senior military officers seized power in a coup d'état following the death of 30-year president Idriss Déby Itno. The military government, led by Déby's son, pledged to hold elections in 18 months, but it was not fulfilled, and there is widespread doubt that this will happen. The opposition has been critical of the government's human rights record, and there have been several protests against the military rule. The opposition has called for a transitional government led by a civilian president with a military vice president. Beyond the internal frictions, the regional environment is also of great concern. Chad is surrounded by countries that are also suffering political volatility, and internal violent conflicts, including the Central African Republic, Niger and Sudan. Millions of refugees from these nations have tried to find protection in Chad. The political transition in Chad is a critical moment for the country. If the government is able to hold free and fair elections and establish a more democratic system, it would be a major step forward for Chad. The Northern Chad offensive was a military offensive in Northern Chad, initiated by the Chadian rebel group Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), took place from 11 April to 9 May 2021. It began in the Tibesti Region in the north of the country following the 2021 Chadian presidential election. Chadian President Idriss Déby was injured during the offensive on 19 April 2021 and died the next day, and his son Mahamat Déby became acting President of Chad on the same day. A special presidential election was expected in 2022, but was not held until 2024. Electoral body says President Mahamat Idriss Deby's party secured 124 of 188 National Assembly seats in a vote boycotted by the opposition in 2024. The election was boycotted by more than 10 opposition parties, including the main Transformers party, whose candidate, Succes Masra, came second in the presidential election. The main opposition had called the election a "charade" and expressed worries that it would be a repeat of the presidential vote, which election observers said was not

credible. the vote came at a critical period for Chad, which is battling several security challenges – from attacks in the Lake Chad region by the Boko Haram armed group to ending decades-long military cooperation with France, its former colonial power. The severing of military ties echoes recent moves by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, which all kicked out French troops and fostered closer ties with Russia after a string of coups in West and Central Africa's Sahel region.

## • MAURITANIA

Mohamed Ould Ghazouani seems an unlikely stalwart of stability. President of Mauritania since 2019, the former general had participated in no less than two of the six coups that shook the country in the first five decades after its independence from France in 1960. In the first putsch he helped boot out Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, who had ruthlessly repressed people for two decades after himself seizing power in a coup. In the second, he helped topple the country's first democratically elected president and replaced him with his old friend, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who then went on to win two terms as president. And yet Mr Ould Ghazouani has presided over a period of unprecedented calm. Though marred by the arrest of opposition figures, his election in 2019 marked Mauritania's first-ever peaceful transfer of power. He has cooperated with opposition parties, expanded social security and sidelined Mr Aziz, his predecessor, who was jailed for corruption in December. As defence minister and then president he also played an influential part in ousting al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, an Algeria-based jihadist group that launched a series of deadly attacks in Mauritania between 2005 and 2011. A combination of community outreach, mediation with Islamists, and military modernisation has uprooted extremism. Mauritania has been free of terrorism for over 13 years. Mr Ould Ghazouani is expected to win a second term in office in the presidential election scheduled for June 29th, which the UN reckons will be fair and peaceful. Though Mauritania has left coups and terrorism behind, the rest of the region has not. Deaths from conflict in the central Sahel increased by 38% last year, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, a research group. A new crop of military juntas, which have booted out Western troops and UN peacekeepers and brought in Russian mercenaries instead, have fuelled the violence. Mauritania and Chad have been forced to disband the G5 Sahel, a five-country anti-terrorist operation, after the military regimes in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali withdrew.

# United Nations Initiatives & Resolutions

The UN's stance on the Sahel region is centered on addressing the root causes of the crisis and supporting sustainable development and peacebuilding. This is done through the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), which focuses on governance, security, and resilience. The UN also supports the G5 Sahel joint force, a regional initiative for security and counter-terrorism, and advocates for international support for the region. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) MINUSMA was a UN peacekeeping operation which has greatly contributed to the safety and protection of civilians the past decade of its operation. On 16 June 2023, the Malian transitional authorities called for the immediate withdrawal of MINUSMA. The Malian government expressed its displeasure at the lack of the UN's willingness to reform the mission to meet some criteria set by them. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the request was made by a military government which has since failed to bring a transition to civilian rule and has used anti-western sentiment to rally support. In keeping with the request of the host country, on 30 June 2023, the UNSC unanimously voted to end MINUSMA by 31 December in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2690. The Sahel Women's Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD) project, which was launched by the United Nations and the World Bank Group, is a response to a call made by the Presidents of six countries (including the G5): Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Benin joined the initiative in January 2019. The goals of the project are to accelerate the demographic transition, to spur the demographic dividend, and to reduce gender inequality in the Sahel region. The ambitious SWEDD programme, led by UNFPA with WAHO) and partners, has established itself as a benchmark initiative to convert population growth into an economic dividend. Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2195 (2014), and S/PRST/2015/24, which encourages UNOCT to extend its Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism (I-ACT) to the G5 Sahel, UNOCT supports the G5 Sahel particularly in the following areas: Criminal justice ,Border security management and Prevention of radicalization and violent extremism . I-ACT aims to support requesting governments and regional organizations in their implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy at the national and regional level in a coordinated and coherent manner. The I-ACT for the G5 Sahel is implemented within the Framework of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS). In Cameroon, Chad, Mali and Nigeria, with UNDP support, efforts are currently focused on research, community resilience, policy development and implementation incorporating, institutional capacity

building through the "whole government" and "whole society" approach. In Mali and Nigeria which are considered as most affected, the strategy is to transcend prevention by addressing violent extremism and reintegration. In Chad, the focus is on preventive activities on the Islands in Lake Chad. While in Cameroon a country-specific version of the ground-breaking Journey to Extremism research was undertaken in 2019 to better understand Cameroons specific drivers and triggers of extremism. Moving forward, UNDP is broadening its PVE engagement in the Sahel through increased country-specific intervention as well as deepen its regional approach. A Youth and Stabilization for Peace and Security in the Far North of Cameroon project led by UNFPA and other agencies was put in place in 2019 in Maroua. In Burkina Faso, advocacy and awareness campaigns on PVE, social cohesion, crisis prevention and pacific coexistence were carried out and reached more than 35 000 people in the Sahel and the North Central regions.

## **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS PERTAINING TO SAHEL**

### **1. 31 May 2022 – S/RES/2634**

This resolution was on piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea.

### **2. 29 February 2012 – S/RES/2039**

It welcomed the Secretary-General's assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and called on states to implement its recommendations.

### **3. 31 October 2011– S/RES/2018**

It condemned threats of piracy and armed robbery on the seas of the Gulf of Guinea and called for. Selected Security Council Presidential Statements:

### **4. 24 May 2024 – S/PRST/2024/3**

This presidential statement welcomed the appointment in May 2023 of Special Representative Leonardo Santos Simão; highlighted the importance of addressing the underlying conditions conducive to terrorism; and underscored the importance of the timely, nationally owned transition processes and restoration of constitutional order in concerned regional countries.

### **5. 17 August 2021– S/PRST/2021/16**

This presidential statement addressed security trends in the region and expressed concern about deteriorating situations in some countries.

### **6. 3 February 2021– S/PRST/2021/3**

This presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to explore the feasibility of a civilian joint project between UNOWAS and regional organizations, such as the G5, ECOWAS and the African Union, with the aim of stemming and preventing intercommunal violence.



## **SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ON SAHEL**

1. 2 December 2024- S/2024/871

This was a report on West Africa and the Sahel and the activities of UNOWAS.

2. 1 July 2024- S/2024/521

This was a Secretary-General's report on West Africa and the Sahel and the activities of UNOWAS. 3. 2 January 2024- S/2023/1075

This was a report on West Africa and the Sahel and the activities of UNOWAS.

## **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL'S LETTERS**

1. 20 July 2023- S/2023/541

This was written advice of the Peacebuilding Commission to the Security Council on West Africa and the Sahel for a 25 July Council briefing on the region.

2. 19 April 2023- S/2023/290

This letter from the Secretary-General informed the Council of his intention to appoint Mr. Leonardo Santos Simão (Mozambique) as Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel and Head of UNOWAS.

3. 27 January 2023- S/2023/71

This letter took note of the Secretary-General's recommendations for the mandate renewal of UNOWAS in his 20 January 2023 letter (S/2023/70).

## **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING RECORDS**

1. 12 July 2024- S/PV.9685

This was a meeting record on "Peace consolidation in West Africa".

2. 11 January 2024- S/PV.9529

This was a briefing on UNOWAS with Special Representative Leonardo Santos Simão, and Regional Director of the Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin of the Institute for Security Studies, Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni.

3. 25 July 2023- S/PV.9384

This was a briefing on West Africa and the Sahel.

## **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL PRESS STATEMENTS**

1. 27 March 2025- SC/16032

This press statement condemned the 21 March terrorist attack in Niger.

2. 24 January 2025- SC/15980

This press statement condemned 8 January press statements in Benin.

3. 29 February 2024- SC/15607

This press statement condemned in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks that resulted in loss of civilian lives over the months in Burkina Faso, including those on a church in

Essakane and on a mosque in Natiaboani in Burkina Faso on the same day, 25 February 2024.

## **UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS**

1. 1 August 2005- A/60/182

This is a Secretary-General report on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.

2. 20 August 2004- A/59/285

This was a Secretary-General report on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.

## **ADDITIONAL REPORTS BY SUBSIDIARY GROUPS**

1. 30 December 2005- S/2005/833

This was a letter from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa forwarding the annual report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa in 2005.



# Major events that took place in Sahel

## 1. 2015 Mali - MNLA Peace Accord

In May 2015 a peace agreement was negotiated between state parties in Mali including the sovereign Malian government and self-declared Islamic states MNLA, HCUA and MAA. The terms of the agreement call for the decentralization of state institutions, greater representation of peripheral areas in national institutions, the integration of combatants from the signatory armed groups into the national army, and the creation of a Northern Region Development Zone to support economic growth in northern Mali. Although the terms were respected by the signatory parties, the settlement did not include al-Qaeda affiliated organizations, which continued to claim territory and spread their influence with alleged covert support by the MNLA. The accord resulted in a temporary ceasefire but failed to establish long-lived peace and put an end to the crisis as the Accord's signatories, namely the Malian government, northern separatist groups, northern armed groups that favor Malian territorial unity lack the political will required to implement essential pillars of the Accord, which include political decentralization and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants.

## 2. Formation of Sahel G5

Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad are the five nations that constitute the members of the Sahel G5, formed on 19 December 2014. It is responsible for the organization of governmental counter-terrorism action in the region, with the Sahel G5 Joint Task Force being the most important one. The main aim of G5 Sahel was to strengthen cooperation between states and promote financial growth and security in the region by combatting the threat of jihadist organizations operating in the region such as AQIM and Boko Haram.<sup>20</sup> Its impact was greatly decreased with the withdrawal of Mali in 2022, which was followed by the withdrawal of Niger and Burkina Faso by December 2023.

## 3. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

MINUSMA was a UN peacekeeping operation which has greatly contributed to the safety and protection of civilians the past decade of its operation. On 16 June 2023, the Malian transitional authorities called for the immediate withdrawal of MINUSMA. The Malian government expressed its displeasure at the lack of the UN's willingness to reform the

mission to meet some criteria set by them. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the request was made by a military government which has since failed to bring a transition to civilian rule and has used anti-western sentiment to rally support. In keeping with the request of the host country, on 30 June 2023, the UNSC unanimously voted to end MINUSMA by 31 December in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2690.

#### **4.Operation Barkhane and Task Force Takuba**

Operation Barkhane was the evolution of a premature French supportive operation in Mali which then undertook a broader role as an anti-terrorist force, seeking the complete uprooting of jihadist groups from local societies. It was finally terminated in 2021 mainly as a result of its limited success and high casualties. Following the initiation of Operation Barkhane, the European Union adopted a joint policy on the matter with the launch of Task Force Takuba. Similar to its predecessor, it was an antiterrorist campaign but with a stronger peacekeeping role and adjacent humanitarian aid operations. <sup>23</sup> It reached an end in 2022 following the announcement of the termination of operation Barkhane as its main proponent, France had withdrawn.



# United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS)

The UNISS is the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel developed in 2013 at the request of the United Nations Security Council in response to the Sahel crisis. The strategy prioritizes life-saving activities that meet immediate needs, while building the resilience of people and communities as part of a long-term development agenda. The strategy emphasizes the need for continued UN good offices to mobilize political will and resources to address the challenges in the region. It includes a range of innovative actions in the areas of Governance, Security and Resilience. For the implementation of the integrated strategy for the Sahel, the United Nations applies a flexible definition of the broader Sahelo-Saharan region, encompassing West, Central and North African countries, while placing a particular emphasis on five core Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

It was created pursuant to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2056, with the objective to address the structural problems that make the Sahel region vulnerable to conflicts such as poverty, weak governance, underdevelopment, etc. It works through a collective effort by the UN office agencies, funds and programme employing an integrated regional approach and bringing greater coherence to broader international investments in the Sahel. The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel carves out ten countries and focuses on three strategic goals: Governance, Resilience and Security. In the area of Governance, it involves a combination of (1) capacity-building measures, aimed to improve the delivery of essential services, and (2) political inclusion, aimed to promote broad consensus amongst the population over the country's priorities. In terms of security, the strategy focuses on strengthening border management. Given the vastness of the Sahel region, and the length and porosity of many of the borders, the strategy entails a combination of capacity building measures and the promotion of collaborative efforts among States. Collaborative management of borders is not only about constraining the activities of criminals and terrorists, but also about giving opportunity to legitimate economic activity. The third overall objective of the strategy is focusing on supporting vulnerable households and promoting food and nutritional security, while also building capacity for long term resilience.

To reach a broad consensus, the Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting on the Sahel, on the margins of the 68th UN General Assembly. At the meeting, all countries of the region, as well as donor countries and institutions, expressed their support for the strategy and emphasized the importance of regional and national ownership. In addition,

the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairperson of the African Union, the President of the World Bank, the President of the African Development Bank and the European Development Commissioner jointly visited the region in November 2013. They highlighted the challenges and opportunities for the implementation of the strategy and mobilized resources and political support. Likewise, during a ministerial-level meeting on the Sahel, organized by the Government of Mali during the visit, the region welcomed the Integrated Strategy and agreed on a broad set of common priorities. They decided to continue meeting every six months, on a rotating Chairmanship basis.

In 2018, the UNISS Support Plan was elaborated to accelerate results on the ground. It targets 6 priority areas whose effective implementation will plant and nurture the seeds of transformation in the Sahel. These are cross border and regional cooperation; preventing and resolving conflicts; inclusive and equitable growth; resilience to climate change; access to renewable energy and women and youth empowerment. The UNISS and its Support Plan are the two guiding frameworks for system-wide joint efforts to advance peace and sustainable development in the region. All UN entities in the region are involved in implementing the UNISS. Leadership of the UNISS strategic goals and priority areas of the Support Plan is based on each agency's comparative advantage, but delivery strongly relies on joined-up action. For example, Resilience is led by UNICEF, WFP and FAO, while UNOWAS and UNODC lead Security. In all cases, all other UN entities contribute as participating agencies.

The implementation of the UNISS was recently given impetus through the rolling out of the United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel (UNSP 2018-2030). The UNSP is an instrument to foster greater coherence and coordination among UN entities in scaling up efforts to accelerate shared prosperity and lasting peace in the region. The changing dynamics in the Sahel require an accelerated response through a combination of humanitarian, development, and crisis prevention actions.

# Involvement of Non-State Actors in this conflict

Non-state actors are entities that are not part of a government or state apparatus but can influence or affect international relations, global governance, and domestic policies. These actors can be individuals, groups, or organizations that operate independently of governments.

The Sahel region has been affected by various terrorist groups or non state actors including:

## **A.The Jihadist Groups**

### **1. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM):**

A branch of Al-Qaeda that is operating in North Africa. Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb is an Algeria-based Sunni Muslim extremist group. It originally formed in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a faction of the Armed Islamic Group, which was the largest and most active terrorist group in Algeria. In 2012, AQIM took advantage of political chaos in northern Mali, working with local Tuareg national elements to take control of major cities, including Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. The Islamic militant group Ansar al-Din was formed to support the creation of an Islamic state in Mali ruled by sharia. In 2013 AQIM suffered setbacks in northern Mali following the French-led military intervention in the region, which caused them to lose control of the major cities there and resulted in the deaths of a number of key personnel. As of 2015, however, AQIM was regrouping in parts of northern Mali and conducted a number of attacks on UN forces in the region. Since 2011, dissident groups of AQIM members broke away to form MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) and al-Mulathamun Battalion and its subordinate unit al-Muwaqqi'un Bil-Dima ("Those Who Sign With Blood") led by former AQIM battalion leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar. In August 2013 these groups merged to form al-Murabitun and officially formalized the groups' ties; their stated goals are to "unite all Muslims from the Nile to the Atlantic in jihad against Westerners" and to curb French influence in the region. In 2014 and 2015 additional AQIM members split from the organization to join groups affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. AQIM employs conventional terrorist tactics, including guerrilla-style ambushes, and mortar, rocket, and IED attacks. The group's principal sources of revenue include extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and donations. In June of 2009, the group publicly claimed responsibility for killing US citizen Christopher Leggett in Mauritania because of his missionary activities. In 2011, a Mauritanian court sentenced a suspected AQIM member to death and two others to prison for the American's murder.

## **2. Ansar Dine:**

A Tuareg-led jihadist group in Mali. Ansar al-Dine (AAD) was an al-Qaeda-aligned armed group that aspired to create an Islamic state in Mali, targeting Malian civilians and government forces as well as foreign troops and peacekeepers. AAD formed in November 2011 as a Tuareg rebel group under Iyad Ag Ghali and in mid-2012 began an association with AQIM, in part because of their shared desire to implement sharia law in Mali. After a coup in 2012 toppled the Malian Government, AAD seized control of territory in northern Mali until a French intervention in 2013 ousted the militants, leading AAD to retreat and regroup. In mid-2016, AAD reemerged and in a matter of days conducted four attacks that killed 21 people and injured 35. In 2017, AAD merged with three other extremist groups to form Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and Ghali was named the overall JNIM amir.

## **3. Macina Liberation Front:**

A jihadist group operating in central Mali. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), a.k.a. Katiba Macina, is an al-Qaeda-aligned armed group that seeks to expel western influence and establish an Islamic state in the Sahel. A radical Fulani preacher, Amadou Kouffa, founded the MLF in 2015 in an attempt to resurrect the 19th century Peuhl Empire of Macina. In 2017, the MLF merged with three other extremist groups to form Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The MLF is a key component in JNIM, accounting for a plurality of violent events observed in the Sahel in 2021.

**OPERATING AREAS :** Based primarily in central Mali; has expanded operations into Niger and Burkina Faso; Western and local governments are concerned by the group's nascent efforts targeting coastal West African states.

## **4. Ansarul Islam:**

A jihadist group operating in Burkina Faso. This group began as a localised insurgency in the northern provinces of Burkina Faso, under the leadership of Malam Ibrahim Dicko. Dicko was a Peul commander linked to Ansar al-Din who was arrested by French forces in Mali in 2015 and then later released. The group's first attack against Burkinabe forces was in December 2016, when they killed 12 gendarmes in Nassoumbou. The insurgency has quickly expanded since then. Today, Ansarul Islam is composed largely of Peul fighters and it conducts attack across northern and eastern Burkina Faso, as well as operating on the other side of the Malian border. It is believed to be in close contact with members of Katibat Macina as well as Almansour Ag Alkassoum (before his death) and his fighters. It also operates increasingly along Burkina Faso's border with Niger. When Malam Dicko died in 2017, he was replaced by his brother, Jafar Dicko, as leader. ISGS fighters were responsible for the deadly attack that killed four American soldiers and five Nigerien soldiers at Tongo Tongo in the province of Tillabéry, as well as



dozens of attacks against Nigerien, Malian, and Burkinabe troops, militias like the Mouvement pour le Salut de l'Azawad (MSA), and Groupe d'Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA). It has in recent months expanded its territorial operations along the Niger-Burkina Faso border, as well as into the Gourma region south of Timbuktu in Mali.

## **B.Other Groups**

### **1. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS):**

A branch of the Islamic State operating in the Sahel region. This local branch of the Islamic State group

(ISIS) was at first self-proclaimed, the outgrowth of a schism within MUJAO. The group's leader, the former MUJAO commander Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, declared his adherence to the Islamic State in May 2015, although ISIS only recognised the pledge of allegiance (bay'a) to its leader Abubakr al-Baghdadi in October 2016. ISGS began receiving regular attention from formal ISIS media outlets in spring 2019. The group operated first in western Niger and Ménaka, in north-eastern Mali, while also conducting several attacks in Burkina Faso near the border with Mali and an attack on a high-security prison near Niger's capital Niamey in October 2016. ISGS fighters fought a battle in June 2015 with al-Mourabitoun fighters loyal to Mokhtar Belmokhtar, but subsequently the groups have avoided clashes. At times, ISGS has operated in proximity – and possibly even cooperation – with fighters from JNIM.

### **2. Boko Haram:**

Although primarily active in Nigeria, Boko Haram has also carried out attacks in neighboring countries, including Chad and Niger. Boko Haram, which refers to itself as “Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad” (JASDJ; Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad) and “Nigerian Taliban”—other translations and variants are used—is a Nigeria-based group that seeks to overthrow the current Nigerian Government and replace it with a regime based on Islamic law. It is popularly known in Nigerian and Western media as “Boko Haram,” which means “Western education is forbidden” (the word boko is a holdover from the colonial English word for book). The group, which has existed in various forms since the late 1990s, suffered setbacks in July 2009 when clashes with Nigerian Government forces led to the deaths of hundreds of its members, including former leader Muhammad Yusuf.

In July 2010, Boko Haram's former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau, appeared in a video claiming leadership of the group and threatening attacks on Western influences in Nigeria. Later that month, Shekau issued a second statement expressing solidarity with al-Qa’ida and threatening the United States. Under Shekau's leadership, the group has continued to demonstrate growing operational capabilities, with an increasing use of improvised explosive device (IED), vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), and female suicide attacks

against a wide range of targets. The group set off its first VBIED in June 2011. On 26 August 2011, Boko Haram conducted its first attack against a Western interest—a vehicle-bomb attack on UN headquarters in Abuja—killing at least 23 people and injuring more than 80. A purported Boko Haram spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack and promised future targeting of US and Nigerian Government interests. Boko Haram's capability increased in 2014, with the group conducting near-daily attacks against Christians, security and police forces, the media, schools, politicians, and Muslims perceived as collaborators. Boko Haram continued to raise its international profile in 2015, pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in March—and publicly using the name "ISIL-West Africa Province" and similar variants—and conducting simultaneous suicide bombings in N'Djamena, Chad, in June—the first such attack in that country's capital. Boko Haram's violence—including the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in Borno State, Nigeria, in April 2014—brought international condemnation and in February 2015 provoked a large regional CT offensive against the group that displaced it from the majority of its strongholds in Nigeria. Nonetheless, Boko Haram remains resilient, conducting attacks in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, Niger, as well as Nigeria, emphasizing the threat it poses to Western and regional interests.

The US State Department designated Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2013.

### **3. Al-Mourabitoun:**

A jihadist group operating in the Sahel region, affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

### **4. Ansaroul Islam:**

A Burkinabé jihadist group.

### **5.JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen):**

Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is a terrorist group based in Mali and active across much of West Africa, including parts of Burkina Faso and Niger. It formed in March 2017, when four Mali-based extremist groups—Ansar al-Din, al-Murabitun, the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and the Sahara Emirate subgroup of al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—announced that they had merged, formalizing cooperation among them. The leader of JNIM, Iyad ag Ghali, pledged the group's allegiance to the amir of AQIM, to the amir of al-Qa'ida, and to the leader of the Taliban. JNIM is a Salafi-Jihadist organization that aligns itself with al-Qa'ida's global jihadist ideology and exploits local divisions and grievances to grow its support in the region. The group seeks to build a Salafi-Islamist state in West Africa and to expel Western influences from the region. Ghali has stated that JNIM's strategy is to expand its presence across West Africa and train militants to fight against the group's enemies while appeasing local communities by giving them material resources and signing local agreements. JNIM regularly attacks French, multinational, and local security forces in West Africa, as well as

local and foreign civilians in the region.

## **OBSERVATIONS:**

The increasing power of violent extremist groups in the Sahel region remains a major concern as they aggravate the existing humanitarian crisis and continue to cause further instability within the African continent. This disruption also has serious economic and military implications for the United States and European countries. The vacuum created by the lack of international support for counter terrorism enables the growth of radical organizations. The inadequacy of regional leadership has allowed for groups such as JNIM, ISGS, ISWAP to attack government forces and civilians. Meanwhile, non-state actors, including the Wagner Group, have taken advantage of the lack foreign presence, increasing their influence within the region. The consequences of this scenario can be extremely alarming. The existing threats posed by the lack of international control could be worsened by increased collaboration between terrorist organizations and hybrid terrorist- criminal syndicates. Such instability in the Sahel region is bound to have both global and regional ramifications for international security. Given the severity of the case, addressing the possible impacts of violent extremism needs to be done collectively. The need to multilaterally work to resolve the issue is clear, and to do so; focus should be placed on increasing regional support to dismantle extremist groups.

## **ADDITIONAL NOTES AND STUDIES:**

In January 2023, UN experts advocated for an independent investigation into potential war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by government forces and the Wagner Group in Mali. The experts claimed a “climate of terror and complete impunity” characterized the Wagner Group’s activities in the country, pointing to the Moura massacre in March 2022. Wagner’s future in West Africa is less certain after the group’s failed June 2023 rebellion in Russia, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia would allow its African operations to continue. In July 2023, the United States accused Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin of orchestrating Mali’s decision to expel MINUSMA to advance Wagner’s interests. Neighboring Burkina Faso has denied contracting Wagner Group, but the interim president said Russia is a strategic ally. In 2023, security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso faced allegations of civilian massacres. First, in April, survivors of a massacre in Burkina Faso blamed the military for the deaths of 136 civilians. Then, in May, the UN released a report accusing Malian soldiers and foreign fighters of executing more than five hundred civilians in a March 2022 operation. Meanwhile, armed groups have stepped up attacks on poorly trained civilian volunteer

forces. The withdrawal of the UN from Mali raises the risk of violence against civilians, as extremist groups might attempt to seize urban centers as they have in Burkina Faso. A July 26 coup d'état in Niger, the ninth attempted overthrow of a West African government in the last three years, dealt a significant blow to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in the Sahel. Niger's government fended off a coup attempt in March 2021, two days before President-elect Mohamed Bazoum assumed office, but the most recent coup attempt succeeded in unseating him. Despite pressure from ECOWAS, including sanctions and the threat of military intervention, the coup leaders have refused to cede power and declared a new government. The military junta have since announced that they will prosecute Bazoum for treason; Bazoum is currently being held in an undisclosed location after a failed escape from his home in Niamey. In response, the African Union suspended Niger, which was the institution's first public communication since it convened immediately following the coup. Nearby military regimes Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali have backed junta, with the latter two vowing to treat military intervention in Niger as a "declaration of war." On September 16, the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger signed a mutual defense pact, solidifying their alliance against external intervention.

Niger had become the West's last major counterterrorism partner in the Sahel in recent years after a series of coups in neighboring countries, but the takeover threatens to upend its status as a bulwark against an expanding power vacuum. Shortly after seizing power, the coup leaders ceased military cooperation with France, which moved its troops to Niger in 2022 as its relations with Mali deteriorated. On October 22, France completed the withdrawal of its forces from Niger, repatriating troops and equipment via Chad and Cameroon. Meanwhile, extremist violence has surged across the Sahel. The first seven months of 2023 saw at least 7,800 civilian deaths, a significant increase from 2022, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). This data contradicts claims by the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger that they are effectively tackling insecurity.

Mali is on the brink of civil war as Islamist groups and Tuareg rebels consolidate power in northern Mali. The increase in violence coincides with the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers with attacks more than doubling since they completed the first phase in August. JNIM, in particular, has taken advantage of the withdrawal to launch a renewed offensive, blockading the northern city of Timbuktu and carrying out a series of attacks on military and civilian targets. In parallel, Mali has redeployed its forces to the northeast as clashes intensify with Tuareg rebels comprising the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA). The Wagner Group is said to be leading the Malian offensive to overtake the rebel stronghold in Kidal. Recent violence in Mali has spilled over into neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger. On September 5, seventeen soldiers and thirty-six volunteer fighters

were killed in clashes with Islamist militants in northern Burkina Faso. Less than a month later, twenty-nine soldiers were killed in an attack by ISGS in western Niger. Worsening instability has led to increasing democratic backsliding as the military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are struggling to regain control in the wake of dissolving international support.




# Foreign Intervention in the Sahel

## 1. FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN MALI:

Since 2012, numerous French-supported security interventions have been deployed in Mali. These include an EU Training Mission, French-directed counterterrorism campaigns (including Operation Serval, Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Initiative), and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Additionally, the G5 Sahel Initiative and other independent security actions, including the participation of private organisations, have been launched to address regional instability. These efforts have had limited success, and sentiment toward France has changed. The perceived effectiveness of these missions in improving the security environment contributed to the view that France was primarily concerned with its own interests rather than Mali's needs. The military transitions in Mali during 2020 and 2021 altered security partnership dynamics. Under Colonel Assimi Goita's leadership, Mali has adopted what it describes as a 'sovereignist' governance strategy, attempting to reduce foreign influences it considers problematic. This approach has received support from segments of the population, particularly younger citizens dissatisfied by international actors' ability to resolve the security crisis. This situation relates partly to the French intervention model, which emphasised direct engagement with professional military personnel over providing training, addressing military corruption, or strengthening local forces' capabilities. The change in sentiment is illustrated in the chart showing the proportion of media articles in Mali expressing negative views about France following the first coup in 2020.


Regional security changed significantly following the 2022 departure of French forces from Operation Barkhane. Security provision responsibilities transferred from French to Malian Armed Forces, with assistance from pro-government militias and the Russian Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group). Despite Barkhane's limited success in securing Mali, it had maintained control near major urban centres while working with UN MINUSMA peacekeepers. Currently, many of these areas face attacks from JNIM and IS-Sahel.



The UN Security Council ended MINUSMA's mission in Mali in June 2023 after the Malian government withdrew its support. MINUSMA, established in 2013, encountered challenges providing security beyond its base locations due to operational territories and infrastructure limitations. The withdrawal of peacekeepers, completed in December 2023, coincided with increased violent conflicts in areas previously secured by UN forces. Conflicts for control of former UN installations developed, involving Malian forces, Africa Corps personnel, Tuareg rebels, and JNIM. The November 2023 conflict in Kidal represented significant fighting between government and rebel forces since the 2015 peace agreement. This accord ended in January 2024, leading to increased conflict across northern Mali.

Russian involvement in Mali has grown considerably. Through their private military contractor Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group), the Russian government deployed to Mali in December 2021, operating alongside Malian forces in counterterrorism operations. Russian PMC troops potentially participate in operations against extremist groups in Burkina Faso as well. Russia and Africa Corps' effectiveness as security partners in the region is comparable to previous missions. The Africa Corps has shown limited effectiveness in providing security while becoming involved in mining and resource extraction. January 2024 opinion polling showed Malian citizens supported both the junta's security approach and relations with Russia, the latter receiving 82 per cent approval. Whether this sentiment continues remains uncertain. In July 2024, at least 84 Russian personnel died in an ambush by Tuareg rebels near the Mali-Algeria border.

Offensives in Northern Mali have not significantly improved security conditions, and reports indicate many Russian personnel are becoming reluctant to engage in high-risk missions. Approximately 1,000 Africa Corps personnel are believed to be actively deployed in Mali, down from 2,000 and fewer than the combined 13,000 UN peacekeepers and French troops deployed before both missions withdrew. China, France, and the US maintain influence in Mali. However, there is reduced Malian authority participation in Western assistance missions. US influence increased in 2019 and 2022 as sustained economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation continued. The US remained a key donor, with bilateral foreign assistance rising from \$132 million in 2019 to over \$156 million in 2020. The United States maintained diplomatic connections and supported initiatives to re-establish political stability after the 2020 coup. While military support became restricted following the coup, America endorsed international interventions such as MINUSMA before the mission's termination.



## 2. FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN BURKINA FASO:


COUNTRY PROFILE: GTI Country Rank: 1 (country most impacted by Terrorism)

1,532 dead in 2024 from Terrorism

In 2024, Burkina Faso remained the country most severely impacted by terrorism for the second consecutive year. This year also marked the third successive year with terrorism-related fatalities exceeding 1,000 in the country. The northern and central eastern regions, adjacent to the borders with Mali and Niger, experienced more than two-thirds of all attacks. Centre-Nord registered the highest mortality rate, including the most severe attack of 2024, where JNIM militants killed between 200 and 600 individuals during an assault on soldiers and civilians constructing defensive trenches. JNIM continued as the predominant terrorist organization, responsible for nearly half of Burkina Faso's attacks, with their activities and casualties increasing by over 50 percent. In contrast, IS operations decreased considerably, with only one attack in 2024 compared to eight in 2023, and terrorism deaths attributed to IS decreased by 91 per cent, from 175 to 15. Burkina Faso experienced less direct intervention from foreign powers prior to 2023, except for French troops stationed in the country since 2009. Following the second coup in September 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traore began developing connections with Russia regarding military assistance and, in January 2023, requested the withdrawal of French troops and its ambassador. In January 2024, Russian private military personnel arrived in Ouagadougou, with the maximum presence reaching around 300. However, there has been minimal improvement in the country's security situation. In July 2024, at least 100 of the 'Bear Brigade' military advisors departed from Burkina Faso to support Russian military responses to Ukraine's capture of the Kursk region. Given the severity of the security crisis in Burkina Faso, the impact of Russian troops remains uncertain. Reports indicate that their primary function has been providing direct protection for junta leaders rather than actively participating in combat operations. Beyond direct military support, Russian influence models have advanced their strategic objectives by shaping narratives supportive of the military and countering Western and



UN influence. Russian social media and traditional media campaigns have been operational for over a decade throughout Africa, with recent focus on the Sahel. These efforts are extensive, with two Russian-linked influencers collectively reaching over 28 million social media followers. Their content is amplified through a network of hundreds of Russian-associated accounts and pages. Burkina Faso has experienced at least eight Russian-backed influence campaigns, matching the activity documented in Mali and the Central African Republic, both hosting significant Russian presence. Africa Corp has served as the principal instrument for orchestrating influence efforts in Africa, connected to nearly half of all Russian operations on the continent. Since Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in 2023, Russia's information activities are transitioning to new entities, including the Russian Africa Corps and the Africa Initiative News Agency. Russia has established its own media infrastructure with online, television, and radio channels. Russian embassies have reportedly facilitated the creation of African organizations to produce and disseminate information. The data illustrates the growth of Russia's influence in the region, beginning in 2017 and steadily increasing in scope. The initiation and growth of Russian influence correlates with the increase of negative sentiment in Burkina Faso towards France. US influence also increased during this period due to sustained economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation. Despite political changes, including the January 2022 coup d'état, the US remained a key partner, providing significant development assistance and supporting efforts to counter extremism in the Sahel region. Politically, the US maintained diplomatic relations and supported efforts to restore stability following the coup, ensuring continued engagement. Military and other forms of assistance were frozen following the coup, suggesting that US influence may decrease in the future.



The influence landscape, similar to Mali, remains complex. China has steadily increased its influence, having achieved its goal of Burkina Faso terminating its cooperation with Taiwan in 2019. China has secured gold, copper, and nickel exploration licenses and has also established relations with the new government. While Chinese interests

predominate along economic lines, there is a growing commitment to protect its interests against security threats. China has pledged 1 billion Yuan (\$136 million) in military assistance to train 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement members across Africa. This pledge, part of China's Global Security Initiative, includes support for an African standby force to operations. Such a development is consistent with China seeking to protect its influence, especially in regions where non-state armed actors affect its investments. The direct implications for security dynamics, particularly in a country like Burkina Faso, remain to be determined.


### **3.FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN NIGER:**

COUNTRY PROFILE: GTI Rank: 5 (5th country most affected by Terrorism)

930 dead from Terrorism in 2024

Terrorism in Niger reached unprecedented levels in 2024, continuing the upward trend observed in 2023. Attacks increased to 101, up from 62 in 2023, while fatalities nearly doubled to 930. Deaths among civilians tripled, and military casualties rose to 499, constituting over half of all fatalities and representing the highest military death toll from terrorism globally in 2024. The most significant attack occurred in the Tahoua region near the Malian border, where more than 300 gunmen killed 237 soldiers. While no organization has claimed responsibility, extremist groups are known to operate in the area. This incident was also the deadliest terrorist attack worldwide in 2024. Tillabéri, situated in the tri-border area with Burkina Faso and Mali, remained the most affected region. It accounted for 63 percent of attacks and 67 percent of fatalities in Niger, with violence extending into neighbouring regions such as Tahoua, where deaths increased fivefold. JNIM operations intensified significantly, with 13 attacks resulting in 109 deaths, representing a 14-fold increase in fatalities and the group's highest impact in Niger to date. IS attacks maintained their previous frequency, though deaths attributed to them decreased by half to 108. In July 2023, Niger underwent a military coup when the presidential guard overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum, with General Adourahmane Tchiani taking control. The coup leaders justified their actions by citing Bazoum's failure to address extremist threats, although this explanation was widely viewed as a pretext, particularly given the relatively low frequency of terrorist attacks before the coup. The political change triggered a diplomatic situation, with regional powers threatening intervention and raising the risk of interstate conflict. By late 2023, Niger had distanced itself from Western allies, terminating security cooperation with the EU while exploring relationships with Russia. The government severed military ties with both France and the US. France withdrew its 1,500 troops in December 2023. In May 2024, the US was instructed to remove its forces from the country including surrendering their \$100 million

Airbase 101 in Niamey and Airbase 201 in Agadez in northern Niger, which had become AFRICOM's primary base for counterterrorism and drone operations in the region. The withdrawal was completed in September 2024, marking the end of both US and French presence in any of the three Sahelian states. Niger and Burkina Faso also withdrew from the G5 Sahel following Mali's earlier exit, affecting the alliance. Meanwhile, Russian influence campaigns increased before and after the coup. Unlike Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger had no prior diplomatic history with Russia or the Soviet Union, making this a notable shift. Since the coup, Russia has deployed military instructors and supplied military equipment, including aircraft, to Niger's government.



China and Russia, both significant uranium consumers, have been establishing agreements in Niger while French corporations such as Orano and Canada's GoviEx have had their operational permits cancelled, losing access to their mining sites. Simultaneously, a predominantly Chinese-owned uranium mining enterprise is preparing to restart operations after a decade of inactivity. This coincides with forecasts suggesting China will need approximately four times more uranium between 2023 and 2040.

The geopolitical changes and evolving dynamics in the Sahel have generated uncertainty regarding their effect on terrorism. Counterterrorism collaboration between the Alliance of Sahelian States and neighbouring countries is now influenced by divisions among states aligned with Russia, the US or France. In January 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced a 5,000-strong joint military force to conduct counterterrorism operations in areas where terrorist groups operate across borders. Given the transnational nature of the counterterrorism challenge, effective operations require collaboration extending beyond the Alliance of Sahelian States to include North Africa, other Sahel states, and Coastal West Africa. Continued active involvement from the US and EU countries may remain important. This is necessary for disrupting the flow of illicit financing and weapons that sustain these organisations. Influential regional states like

Nigeria will lead these efforts, and cooperation between the alliance and other neighbours such as Algeria and Libya will likely prove important. While Russian and Chinese influence is growing in the region, the European Union and US are unlikely to abandon their interests. With increasing conflict within the region and growing external competition for influence, the security outlook for the Central Sahel presents ongoing challenges.



# Case Study 2: Sahel as a pawn of Western Paternalism

Paternalism is the use of leverage or coercion by stronger states to influence the decision making of weaker states in alignment with the former's objectives and goals. The backlash to Western paternalism in the Sahel in recent years has largely played out in the worsening relationship between France and the region. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have broken off ties with France for two main reasons. The most crucial driver of the fraying security ties is the limited success of French operations in the Sahel in stemming the rise of insurgent and terrorist groups in the region. Most notable of these is Operation Barkhane, the embattled French-led counterinsurgency operation in the Sahel with support from the United States, came to an unceremonious end in 2022 as a wave of coup leaders in the region cut ties with France.


The second most cited reason for breaking ties with France is its paternalistic practices. *Françafrique*, a French portmanteau that is used to describe France's sphere of influence in Africa, was characterized by decades of economic influence, military interventions, and political meddling. Western countries more broadly have a long history of coercing weaker states to partner with them rather than their rivals. This coercion (both from the West and their rivals) famously led to creation of the Non-Alignment Movement during the Cold War that is experiencing a resurgence in this era of great power competition.

With the termination of the U.S. security agreement in Niger, the United States has lost its prime foothold in the Sahel, a vital air base that cost \$100 million to construct, and dealt a reputational blow to the United States. For all of the limitations of the United States, Niger lost a resourceful security partner after the coup when the United States largely suspended military aid. This comes at a time of deep insecurity in the region. The border region between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso has been a hotbed for jihadist attacks. The number of political violence incidents in Niger increased in 2022, but the number of deaths has decreased, according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED found that in the first half of 2023, political violence in Niger decreased by roughly 39 per cent compared to the prior six months (July–December of 2022). Whether this positive momentum will be stymied by the end of Niger's security cooperation with the United States will remain to be seen. Civilians in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger continue to suffer the consequences of the steady spread of insurgency and terrorism. In 2022, 43 percent of all global terrorism-related deaths occurred in the Sahel, according to the Global Terrorism Index. Burkina Faso and Mali alone accounted for 52 per cent of all terrorism deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa. The need for security

assistance in the immediate term is clear. and Russia has seized on this power vacuum to strengthen its military ties with Niger, although the terms of this partnership are unclear. Security partnerships between Russia and military governments in the Sahel also provide regime protection to the latter, by protecting them against internal threats.

Niger's decision to cut ties with the United States was spurred in part by warnings from the U.S. delegation against developing closer ties with Russia, to which the CNSP took offense. In a televised statement, Colonel Abdramane described these warnings from the U.S. delegation as an attempt to "deny the sovereign Nigerien people the right to choose their partners and types of partnerships capable of truly helping them fight against terrorism." Colonel Abdramane added that the delegation failed to follow diplomatic protocol by failing to share the date of arrival of the delegation, its composition, and its agenda. The delegation was received by Nigerien prime minister Ali Lamine Zeine, but failed to meet with General Tchiani as originally planned. Colonel Abdramane also noted in his address that "the government of Niger forcefully denounces the condescending attitude accompanied by the threat of retaliation from the head of the American delegation towards the Nigerian government and people."Whether these paternalistic slights are perceived or unintended, their material impact is real: France and now the United States are losing footing in the Sahel, a region that is vital for security in West and North Africa. This loss in traction also comes at a time of intense political contestation between the United States and China, as well as the United States and Russia, for influence in the Global South. China is growing into Africa's leading trade partner and Russia's private military company Wagner (now known as the Africa Corps) continues to make inroads as the security partner of choice for military governments in the Sahel. Broadly speaking, years of military operations by Sahelian countries and Western partners have failed to make significant inroads in addressing the growing security issues. This speaks to the failure of a military-first approach that cannot address the root causes of insecurity in the Sahel: poor governance, deeply rooted corruption, poverty, scarcity of resources, and local grievances.

# Suggested Topics for Moderated Caucuses

1. Deliberating upon the role of foreign military interventions and their impact on Sahel countries' sovereignty and stability
  2. Addressing the coordination challenges between UN agencies and regional partners in implementing UNISS
  3. Examining the role of regional organizations in complementing the UN peacekeeping operations in the Sahel
  4. Deliberating upon the role of Non State Actors(NSAs) in accelerating coups d'état in the Sahel Region
  5. Addressing the challenges in the management of Military Transition Governments in Post-Coup Scenarios in the Sahel region amidst
  6. Deliberating upon the Sahel region as a region prone to coup d'état and violent extremism and discussing pragmatic solutions to cater the same.
  7. Determining rational solutions to dismantle the non state actors and violent extremist groups in the Sahel
  8. Deliberating upon the legitimacy of foreign intervention in response to the political landscape of the Sahel region.
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# External Links & Resources

1. <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/63983f944.pdf>
2. <https://uniss-sahel.org/#:~:text=The%20UN%20has%20developed%20a,in%20governance%2C%20security%20and%20resilience.>
3. <https://unowas.unmissions.org/implementation-united-nations-integrated-strategy-sahel>
4. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2018/12/briefing-on-the-un-integrated-strategy-for-the-sahel.php>
5. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608822/EPRS\\_AT\\_A\(2017\)\\_608822\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608822/EPRS_AT_A(2017)_608822_EN.pdf)
6. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-union-suspends-niger-all-its-activities-following-coup-2023-08-22/>
7. <https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/548-resolution-coup-detats-military-transitions-and-attendant-violations>
8. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/31/african-union-meets-on-gabon-situation-after-military-coup>
9. <https://democracyin africa.org/the-scourge-of-popular-coups-in-africa/>
10. <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230219-african-union-vows-zero-tolerance-for-coups-as-two-day-summit-ends>
11. <https://unsdg.un.org/latest/stories/bridging-divides-and-building-futures-sahel?>
12. <https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/news/strategy-gender-sahel-unodc/>
13. <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/63983f944.pdf>
14. <https://uniss-sahel.org/#:~:text=The%20UN%20has%20developed%20a,in%20governance%2C%20security%20and%20resilience>
15. <https://unowas.unmissions.org/implementation-united-nations-integrated-strategy-sahel>
16. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2018/12/briefing-on-the-un-integrated-strategy-for-the-sahel.php>
17. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608822/EPRS\\_AT\\_A\(2017\)\\_608822\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608822/EPRS_AT_A(2017)_608822_EN.pdf)